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Abstract 
 
Power law distributions of macroscopic observables are ubiquitous in both the 
natural and social sciences. They are indicative of correlated, cooperative 
phenomena between groups of interacting agents at the microscopic level. In this 
paper we argue that when one is considering aggregate macroeconomic data 
(annual growth rates in real per capita GDP in the seventeen leading capitalist 
economies from 1870 through to 1994) the magnitude and duration of recessions 
over the business cycle do indeed follow power law like behaviour for a 
significant proportion of the data (demonstrating the existence of cooperative 
phenomena amongst economic agents). Crucially, however, there are systematic 
deviations from this behaviour when one considers the frequency of occurrence of 
large recessions. Under these circumstances the power law scaling breaks down. 
It is argued that it is the adaptive behaviour of the agents (their ability to 
recognise the changing economic environment) which modifies their cooperative 
behaviour. 
1. Introduction 
 
The analytical tools used to characterise the behaviour of complex, disordered 
systems such as spin glasses [1] has become a paradigm for the study of a wide 
variety of other systems. These include biological, social and economic systems 
[2]. In the context of economic and social systems, the behaviour of the system is 
determined by the interaction of a large number of heterogeneous agents. Each of 
these agents has their own objectives (typically the maximization of their 
individual utilities) and has access only to a restricted subset of all the possible 
available information (thus each agent makes decisions based upon bounded 
rationality). The heterogeneous nature of the agents gives rise to a dynamical 
evolution of the system characterised by interactions which are both frustrated 
and disordered. It is not surprising therefore that power laws may characterise 
phenomena such as the distribution of wealth [3] of individuals in a social 
economy. 
 
It is commonly assumed that the observation of power-law distributions (fractal 
behaviour) in a systems macroscopically observable quantities is a characteristic 
footprint of cooperative behaviour in many-body systems representing the effects 
of correlated behaviour amongst the systems constituents. Power law distributions 
are both self-similar and scale free demonstrating that events may occur on all 
length and time scales. It is also argued that the precise details of the microscopic 
interactions between the systems constituents do not alter the fundamental nature 
of the distribution of macroscopic events observed i.e. the phenomenon of 
universality. 
 
There is a crucial difference however between ‘dumb’ particles interacting with 
one another via fixed physical laws and economic agents (individuals) interacting 
with one another; namely that individuals are capable of adapting their rules of 
interaction to reflect the economic environment in which they are placed. 
 
In this paper we will argue that when one is considering aggregate 
macroeconomic data (annual growth rates in real per capita GDP in the seventeen 
leading capitalist economies from 1870 through to 1994) the magnitude and 
duration of recessions over the business cycle do indeed follow power law like 
behaviour for a significant proportion of the data (demonstrating the existence of 
cooperative phenomena amongst the economic agents). Crucially, however, there 
are systematic deviations from this behaviour when one considers the frequency 
of occurrence of large recessions. Under these circumstances the power law 
scaling breaks down. It is argued that it is the adaptive behaviour of the agents 
(their ability to recognise the changing economic environment) which modifies 
their cooperative behaviour. 
 
2. The Data 
 
The data on real per capita GDP in dollars is taken from the OECD monograph 
[4].  Data for each year from 1870 through 1994 is used for the following 
countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and the United States.1  Details of the method of calculating an 
appropriate set of exchange rates with which to convert all the series to a real 
dollar basis, and also the procedures to allow for variations in the size of the 
territory of some of the countries over time may be found in[4].   
 
Annual growth rates are calculated by taking the percentage change of the data.  
In much applied economic analysis, growth rates are defined as the first 
difference of the natural logs of the data.  The results are very similar regardless 
of which of the two definitions is used.  But the former is easier to appreciate in 
this context, given that some very large falls in output have taken place so the two 
calculations do not yield almost identical numbers.  For example, in 1945 output 
                                                 
1 Data on Japan are only available from 1885, and for Switzerland from 1900 
in Japan fell by 49 per cent, a figure which can perhaps be grasped more readily 
than the fact that the natural log of Japanese output fell by 0.68 in that year. 
 
2.1 The Duration of Recessions 
 
The first step in the analysis was to focus on the periods of recession, defined as 
being those years in which growth was less than zero.  Although there is debate as 
to what growth rate technically constitutes a recession, this measure is 
unequivocal.  The duration of any recession was then calculated for each country, 
allocated into the appropriate group and the totals for each group added up.  
 
In other words, the number of times a recession lasted just one year for any given 
country was calculated, the number of times a recession lasted two years, and so 
on.  Recessions lasting more than one year are only allocated to one category, so 
that, for example, a period in which growth was negative for three successive 
years is counted as a three year recession, and the years in this sequence are not 
allocated as well into the one and two-year categories.  The longest recession 
noted was in Austria, when growth was negative in each of the years from 1913 
through 1919, a period of seven years. 
 
The individual country data on duration was pooled, giving a total number of 336 
observations across the seventeen country sample.  The distribution is shown in 
Figure 1, where it can be seen that there were some 200 examples of recessions 
lasting only one year, just under 100 lasting two years, and so on. 
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The relationship between the frequency, N , of the observations and the duration, 
D , in years of a recession is postulated to be of the form of a power law: 
 
 β
α
D
N =          (1) 
 
Equation (1) could be estimated by either taking a log-log transformation, or by a 
direct non-linear algorithm.  The latter gives a somewhat better fit, and these are 
the results reported in table 1. 
 Table 1 Estimation of equation (2): 
 
 α  =  209.6, with a standard error of 13.4 
 
 β  =  -1.69, with a standard error of 0.20 
 
standard error of the equation is 13.54 (28.2 per cent of the mean of the dependent 
variable). 
 
The robustness of these results was checked in two ways.  First, equation (1) was 
estimated for the eight individual countries where a recession of at least five 
years’ duration had taken place.  Qualitatively, the results are identical to those 
reported above for the pooled sample of 17 countries.  The exponent is not 
significantly different in any case from the -1.69 of the pooled sample. 
 
Similar results were also obtained using two different definitions of recession 
years.  The overall mean growth rate of each country was subtracted from the 
actual growth rate, and observations of this variable of less than zero were 
classified as recession years.  The second definition was a refinement of this 
concept.  Studies have identified four distinct regimes of capitalist economies, 
from 1870-1913, 1913-50, 1950-73 and 1973 onwards [4].  The sample mean of 
each country during each of these regimes was subtracted from the actual growth 
rate, and again observations of less than zero were counted as recession years.  
The exponent on the duration variable in the regressions was, respectively, -1.36 
and -1.28, similar to the -1.69 of the pooled sample. 
 
Figure 2 plots the actual and fitted values of (1).  With a perfect fit, all the points 
in the chart would lie on the 45 degree line. 
Frequency of duration of recessions, years
 Actual and fitted values from power law
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The fit is not unreasonable.  However, it is clear that the power law relationships 
suggests that there should have been more recessions of long duration than have 
actually existed. 
 
Duration (years) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Actual   206 88 23 10 5 3 1 
 
Fitted   210 65 33 20 14 10 8 
 
 
It is not really surprising that a power law over-predicts the number of long 
recessions in capitalist economies.  Unlike grains of sand in experiments to 
measure the size of avalanches, individual agents in economies, whether 
governments, firms, or individuals, do have the ability to adapt their behaviour.  
 
Inspecting Figure 2 more closely, the reason for the over-prediction of the longer 
duration recessions becomes clearer.  There appear to be two distinct factors at 
work.  The observations for durations of between two and seven years almost 
form a straight line, with the one-year recession observation being a distinct 
outlier. 
 
This is confirmed by a formal regression using the data for (1) omitting the one 
year duration observation.  The exponent on the duration variable is -3.23 with a 
standard error of only 0.05 and the fit is extremely good, with the equation 
standard error being only 0.3 per cent of the mean of the dependent variable.  
Figure 3 plots this. 
 
Frequency of duration of recessions longer than  1 year
 Actual and fitted values from power law
Figure 3
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Table 3.  Duration of recessions greater than 1 year: Actual and fitted values from 
power law  
 
Duration (years)  2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Actual    88 23 10 5 3 1 
 
Fitted    88 24 9 5 3 2 
 
A similar finding is obtained using the two alternative definitions of recession 
years discussed above.  The exponent is again larger in absolute value than when 
the one year observation is included, and the fit is much better.  Using any of 
these regressions to extrapolate the predicted number of one year recessions gives 
a larger figure than that actually observed.  Using the zero growth definition, for 
example, 256 examples of one year recessions are predicted, compared to the 
actual number of 208. 
 
This suggests that there may be two separate processes going on in the process 
which generates data on capitalist recessions.  When a recession arises, for 
whatever reason, agents appear to have some capacity to react quickly, which 
often prevents the recession from being prolonged beyond one year.  Once this 
has happened, however, recessions can take place on all scales of duration, 
exactly as in the sand pile experiment. 
 
Keynes [5] emphasised the importance of expectations in recessions in the 
capitalist economies. He suggested that once expectations, particularly those of 
companies, about the future become particularly depressed, they are then very 
hard to revive.  In these circumstances, companies, far from adapting in a positive 
manner, continue to cut back on investment and employment, thereby further 
prolonging the recession.  The empirical evidence is certainly consistent with this 
view. 
 2.2 The Size of Recessions 
 
We measure the size of a recession as the cumulative fall in output during the 
recession.  So, for example, in the four-year recession in the United States in the 
early 1930s, output per head fell by a cumulative total of 34.8 per cent. 
 
An important point to note is that the correlation between the duration of a 
recession and its cumulative size is not strong.  Over the sample as a whole, the 
Pearson sample correlation coefficient between duration and size is only 0.52 (the 
absolute value of the size is used, so that a positive correlation indicates that 
longer durations tend to be associated with large falls in output). Trimming the 
most extreme outliers in the size data, mainly because enormous falls in output 
were recorded over short periods of time in the defeated and some of the occupied 
countries at the end of the world wars, makes little difference to the result.  The 
strongest correlation is obtained by omitting 20 per cent of the sample, which 
gives a point estimate of 0.63.   
 
The basic data for the cumulative size of recessions is plotted in figure 4, which 
groups the data into bands of 2 percentage points. 
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The data in Figure 4 are grouped into intervals each spanning two percentage 
point, giving 132 observations for which the cumulative fall in output was 
between 0 and 2 per cent, 69 when it was between 2 and 4 per cent, 34 between 4 
and 6 per cent, and so on.  There are eight observations where the fall is over 40 
per cent: these are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands 
during the Second World War, Austria during the First World War, and Canada 
during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
 
A power law produces an approximation to this data, with the exponent in the 
non-linear regression being -1.29 with a standard error of 0.045.  But the equation 
standard error is 41.3 per cent of the mean of the dependent variable.  The 
essential problem is that the estimated equation predicts considerably too many 
very large recessions, as Figure 5a shows. 
 
Size of recessions, data grouped by 2 percentage points
Actual and fitted from power law equation
Figure 5a
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Omitting the seven largest values from the sample, which are all associated with 
world wars, improves the fit, with the equation standard error being 30.3 per cent 
of that of the dependent variable.  The exponent is -1.28 with a standard error of 
0.06.  However, the problem of over-prediction of large recessions remains. 
  
With the duration data, omitting durations of just one year led to a very marked 
improvement in fit of a power law relationship to the remaining data.  Various 
experiments were carried out on the size data, leaving out durations of just one 
year, leaving out the smallest size recessions, and so on.  But the essential 
problem of over-prediction of the tail of the distribution was not solved. 
 
Grouping the data into wider bands gives somewhat better results.  There have 
been, for example, 201 recessions in which the cumulative fall in output was 
between 0 and 4 per cent, 64 in which it was between 4 and 8 per cent, and so on.  
Using the 4 percentage point bands gives an equation with an estimated exponent 
of -1.81 and a standard error of 0.054.  The equation standard error is 18.6 per 
cent of the mean value of the dependent variable.  The actual and fitted values for 
this equation are plotted in Figure 5b. 
 
Size of recessions, data grouped by 4 percentage points
Actual and fitted from power law equation
Figure 5b
Fitted frequency from power law equation
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Table 3, however, shows that even here the over-fitting of the extreme values 
remains. 
 
Table 3.  Cumulative size of recessions, actual and fitted from power law 
 
Size (%) Actual number Fitted 
 
0-4   201  202 
4-8   64  58 
8-12   32  28 
12-16   9  16 
16-20   7  11 
20-24   3  8 
24-28   6  6 
28-32   2  5 
32-36   4  4 
36+   8  17 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have examined the annual real GDP growth rate data for 
seventeen capitalist economies over the period 1870 - 1994.  The purpose was to 
investigate to what extent the structure of cyclical recessions and expansions 
could be approximated by a power law distribution of events. 
 
It has been found that power law distributions do provide an approximation to 
both the durations and sizes of recessions under capitalism. In each case, 
however, there is an important qualification: estimated power law relationships 
suggest that there should have been more large recessions, both in terms of 
duration and of size, than has actually been the case.  This suggest that agents do 
have a certain amount of adaptability once a recession starts, which sometimes 
prevents it from becoming large or for lasting longer than a year. 
 
The exception to this qualification is for recessions with a duration longer than a 
year, when a power law fits the duration data almost perfectly.  This implies that 
once a recession has lasted for more than a year then there exists the possibility of 
the recession lasting for any duration. In economic terms we might think of the 
long-term expectations of agents, a concept emphasised by Keynes in his work on 
the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Once the long-term expectations of agents 
become depressed, they appear to be very hard to revive. 
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